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FOREWORD
Insurgency―the use of protracted low intensity violence and
political warfare against a government―has been one of the most
pervasive and strategically significant forms of asymmetric conflict
for the past century. In some instances, it actually has succeeded in
overthrowing regimes or forcing occupying powers to withdraw
from a state, thus redrawing the strategic landscape and altering the
course of history. Few other forms of asymmetric conflict can make
this claim.
Just as HIV is a particularly dangerous pathology because it
integrates with other diseases, insurgency tends to meld with other
forms of conflict, be they terrorism, ethnic struggles, separatism,
class struggle, ideological conflict, narcotrafficking, or other forms
of organized crime. This makes it both a complex and a particularly
dangerous opponent, always challenging to the strategist who must
deal with it.
The United States is once again challenged by insurgencies, this
time connected to the Global War on Terrorism. But 21st century
insurgencies are different than the Cold War era ones that generated
existing doctrine and strategy, and which shaped the way that most
American strategists think about insurgency. The beast has mutated
and evolved. So, too, must those who confront it.
To help Army and Department of Defense leaders master these
new challenges, the Strategic Studies Institute publishes a special
series entitled “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st
Century.” This study, by Dr. Thomas A. Marks, which assesses the
growing insurgency in Nepal with its potential to further destabilize
an already volatile region, is a path-breaking and an excellent
inaugural effort in this new series.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
A decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, and insurgency
remains a major factor on the world scene. Whether driven by
separatism, religious alienation, or ideological desire to restructure
the state, insurgents are as active now as in the earlier Cold War era
of state support. Indeed, forced to rely more upon their own devices,
insurgencies have posed increasingly complex problems for the
globe’s numerous weak states which find themselves challenged by
a growing array of development and population issues.
This reality has driven continuous and extensive U.S. military
involvement, thus a renewed need to focus upon the realities of
internal war. Upheavals in once-obscure spots such as Nepal have
come routinely to demand our attention. The study of such cases
will prepare military practitioners for effective engagement -- in
strategies, operational art, and tactics.
Insurgency in Nepal has existed for perhaps 5 decades but
burst into the open only with the declaration of “people’s war” on
February 13, 1996, by the Communist Party (Maoist), or CPN(M),
the most radical offshoot of the leftwing spectrum in Nepali politics.
Desultory action ended when the “Maoists,” as they are universally
termed, unilaterally abrogated talks with the government and
launched a nationwide general offensive in November 2001.
Since that time, a steadily increasing level of violence has left
as many as 8,000 Nepalis dead, a majority of them in little more
than a year. Terror has been integral to the Maoist campaign. US
involvement has played an important role in assisting this minor but
strategically-located democratic state to meet the challenges posed
by ruthless radical actors.
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INSURGENCY IN NEPAL
A decade has passed since the end of the Cold War, and
insurgency remains a major factor on the world scene. This has been
entirely predictable, given the inevitable drive of man to improve his
lot. Whether driven by separatism, religious alienation, or ideological
desire to restructure the state, insurgents are as active now as in the
earlier Cold War era of state support. Indeed, forced to rely more
upon their own devices, insurgencies have posed increasingly
complex problems for the globe’s numerous weak states which
find themselves, more than ever, challenged by a growing array of
development and population issues.
This reality has driven continuous and extensive U.S. military
involvement, thus a renewed need to focus upon the realities of
internal war. Upheavals in once-obscure spots such as Nepal have
come routinely to demand our attention. The study of such cases
will prepare military practitioners for effective engagement―in
strategies, operational art, and tactics.
Insurgency in Nepal has existed for perhaps 5 decades but
burst into the open only with the declaration of “people’s war” on
February 13, 1996, by the Communist Party (Maoist), or CPN(M), the
most radical offshoot of the leftwing spectrum in Nepali politics.1
Desultory action ended when the “Maoists,” as they are universally
termed, unilaterally abrogated ongoing talks with the government
and launched a nationwide general offensive in November 2001.
Since that time, a steadily increasing level of violence has left as
many as 8,000 Nepalis dead, a majority of them in little more than a
year.2
Known as a premier tourist destination, the site of the mighty
Himalayan Mountains, the tallest being the majestic Mt. Everest,
Nepal would hardly seem a candidate for a raging communist
insurgency. Indeed, if anything, its population was recognized not
as rebels but for its loyal service as Gurkhas, perhaps the single most
legendary infantry in the world.
The combination, though―dominant peaks and service as
infantry in foreign armies―actually goes to the heart of the matter. It
is not an accident that over the past nearly 2 centuries, a small, land-
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locked mountain kingdom has sent hundreds of thousands of its
young men into combat for others. To the contrary, Nepalese have
flocked abroad not due to martial bent or any other characteristic,
rather for the oldest reason known to recruiters: need.
Parameters of the Old Regime.
Far from being a Shangri-la, Nepal is 24 million people competing
for livelihood in a country but the size of North Carolina (which
has just 8.2 million). Roughly one-third of the national territory
is the Himalayas, and consequently it has a mere .7 percent of the
population. The lower approximately one-third of the country, the
tarai, scrub jungle now largely cleared, holds 32.1 percent of the
populace. It could not even be settled until the 1970s when several
virulent strains of malaria were conquered. This has resulted in
a popular concentration, 67.2 percent, in the central one-third, or
the hill country. Lest the point be lost, some 16 million people are
sandwiched into “one-third of North Carolina.”
According to a World Bank study made 3 decades ago (1973),
“population density per square kilometer of arable land is probably
as high as 1,000, a concentration similar to that found in certain
Asiatic deltas, but where, in contrast, the soil is more fertile and the
climate allows two to three crops a year.” Conditions of livelihood―
among the worst in the developing world3―were exacerbated,
because an effective lack of any industrial base meant 90 percent
of the population was rural, with 80 percent of the total population
working directly on the land. Though 90 percent of farmers were
classified as owner-operators, this impressive figure was achieved
only by severe division: 50 percent of all households endeavored to
engage in agriculture on plots of less than half a hectare; 7.8 percent
were completely landless.4
Thus the economy has a current Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
of only US$5.5 billion, an annual budget of just US$1.1 billion. In
contrast, the 2003 public school budget for Fairfax County, Virginia,
outside Washington, DC, was passed at US$1.3 billion. The official
leading source of foreign exchange, tourism, in a banner year
interjected the purchasing power of just 250,000 visitors annually,
a limited trickle-down tap. It should come as no surprise that the
United Nations lists Nepal as among the poorest countries in the
world; 80 percent of the populace, surveys consistently find, must do
2

outside work to survive.
Limited development, however, ensures that such work is scarce.
The result is a skewed distribution of resources, in which some have
and others do not. The only solution readily available has been outmigration and participation in the global economy. Historically, for
certain hill tribal groups, this has meant enlistment as soldiers in
the British Indian Army. Such opportunities, though they declined
substantially in British service since Indian independence in 1948,
have continued in the forces of India, but still have no possibility of
absorbing even a sizable fraction of hill tribe job-seekers, much less
others.5 Indeed, Nepalese of all communities seeking relatively wellpaid expatriate work have largely opted for service work abroad,
with the largest single employer being Japan, if India itself―which
has an open border with Nepal―is not considered.6 Regardless, most
job-seekers are unable to obtain external employment, regardless of
destination, and so find themselves mired in poverty. Statistics show
that at least 20 percent of the population lives in extreme, abject
circumstances.
Considering only economic matters, Nepal would be a candidate
for serious dislocation. Exacerbating the situation further, though,
are social parameters: issues of caste, ethnicity, and language.
On the surface, Nepal is a picture of unity, the world’s only
official Hindu kingdom. The constitutional monarch, a living god to
much of the population even in the 21st century, sits atop a society
86.5 percent Hindu and 9.0 percent Buddhist, a society in which
every aspect is dominated by the caste system.
In reality, beneath this picture of unity, is division. There are 60
recognized caste and ethnic groups; only slightly more than half the
population, 56.4 percent, is actually embraced by the caste system.
More than one-third, 35.5 percent, are classified as ethnics, tribal
groups who are outside the caste system. The four largest of these
have just over one million members each: Magar, Tharu, Newar,
and Tamang (Magars supply a plurality of Gurkha manpower in
the British system7). A further 3.6 percent of the people are classified
as belonging to religious communities (e.g., Sikhs, Muslims); 4.5
percent are “others.”
Significantly, half of the caste figure is comprised of the top two
castes, Brahmins and Chhetris, the historic priestly and warrior castes,
3

respectively, 16.1 percent and 12.9 percent of the total population.
Ergo, 29 percent of the populace is structurally positioned, by
religious mandate, to dominate. This they have done and effectively
control all positions of power and influence.8 Not surprisingly,
this leads to charges of unfair advantage, where disproportionate
influence and possession are replicated by religious sanction.
Linguistically, there is also severe division. According to the
1991 Census, Nepal’s people speak 32 languages, with only 50.3
percent claiming Nepali, the national language, as their mother
tongue. Though the second language, Maithili, at 11.9 percent,
is a distant second, the Census notes that some ethnic and caste
groups, which have their own tongues, are not even reflected in the
32 figure. Needless to say, it is the top castes which are brought up
and totally at ease with Nepali, while other groups often struggle,
even as linguistic competence is a key factor in access to coveted
bureaucratic employment, whether in the government or private
sector.
Given such socio-economic division, it would be expected that
politics would play a significant role in mediating contending
demands. For the country is a functioning parliamentary democracy.
Here again, there is more than meets the eye. A democracy only since
1990, Nepal suffers from the, by now, all-too-familiar problems of
the genre “emerging democracy”: corruption, inefficiency, and lack
of focus.9 Compounded by a lack of state integration, the political
system has been able to foster little save a lack of legitimacy.
Nepal emerged as a country in 1774-75. As it reached its present
boundaries, then sought to expand into territory claimed by British
India, it found itself bested in an 1815 war with the East India
Company. As a consequence, most of the tarai was lost, and Nepal
was forced to agree to what effectively was British suzerainty.10
A prime ministerial coup of sorts led to more than 100 years of
hereditary Rana rule, 1846-1950, during which Nepal was closed to
the outside world, save limited British representation. This ended in
November 1950 when India, which desired a greater role in Nepal’s
affairs for defense reasons, supported a royal restoration.11 The king
assumed direct control in December 1960, and only in 1990-91 did
democratic forces emerge triumphant.
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This proved a mixed blessing. The era of Rana rule was not
improved upon by the subsequent 10 years of chaotic transition and
the 30 years of monarch-guided democracy, the so-called panchayat
system. Thus, even as Nepal had all the organization and bureaucracy
of a modern nation-state, in reality it remained a backwater. The writ
of its administrative apparatus―five regions (plus a capital region),
75 districts (each roughly the size of a North Carolina county), and
3,913 Village Development Committees (VDC)―barely extended
beyond district capitals, and most areas of the country could be
reached only on foot. Development was at a primitive level. Little
changed.
Heightened expectations that democracy would make a
difference in the lives of the populace were dashed.12 Though
there were improvements, particularly in the areas of health and
education, these were minor bright spots in an overall dark picture
of self-absorption by the major political parties. The Nepali Congress
(NPC) ruled for all but roughly a single year of the democratic era,
with the legal leftist coalition, the United Marxist-Leninists (UML),
the major opposition. The monarch, who might have been expected
to serve a mediating and leadership role similar to that played so
effectively by King Bhumipol in Thailand, was killed in June 2001
in the so-called “Royal Massacre” and was replaced by his brother,
who therefore, to many, lacked legitimacy.13
Communist Opposition to the Old-Regime.
Into this dynamic, the left had early interjected itself as an active
player, even heading the government for slightly less than a year.
Yet, as happened in Peru with the restoration of democracy in 1980
(after 12 years of attempted military “revolution from above”), the
expectations and passions unleashed, which surfaced particularly
vigorously within the left, saw the proliferation of ever-more radical
options. The result, in the early 1990s, was the Communist Party
of Nepal (Maoist), or CPN(M), a body that in its formative stages
consciously modeled itself on Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path).
Committed to “Gang of Four” Maoism, as had emerged during
the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution―which convulsed
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China with its attempt to “internalize” the dialectic―it demanded
a solution to Nepal’s problems by the establishment of a Maoist
“people’s republic.” Politically, this necessarily meant an end to the
monarchy, to be achieved through a constituent assembly which
would rewrite the constitution. The party also demanded an end
to “Indian imperialism.” Economically, there was to be an end to
capitalist exploitation; socially, an end to caste, ethnic, religious, and
linguistic exploitation. Since the system would not simply accept
these demands, “people’s war” was to be used to force the issue.
People’s war, declared formally by the CPN(M) on February 13,
1996―but explicitly discussed and planned in the early 1990s, if not
before―was by that time, considered in global perspective, a welltested and efficient mechanism for seizure of state power. It may be
assessed to consist of five elements:
• Mass Line: organizing an alternative society through the
construction of clandestine infrastructure. Local socio-economic
grievances and aspirations are to be addressed by cadres, who
then connect solutions to the political mechanism of the party.
As its principal targets, the party worked in hill tribe areas,
especially in the Mid-Western Region, and among dalits, or
untouchables, the lowest caste in the Hindu system.
• United Front: making common cause with those individuals
and groups who shared concerns but not necessarily goals of the
party.
Issues of education, for instance, allowed mobilization of
students who, though apparently not formally CPN(M)
members, nevertheless acted as virtual wings of the party. Tribal
fronts, ostensibly seeking more equitable treatment, were also
very active.
• Military: the new alternative society, existing as it does illegally
and clandestinely, necessarily relies upon armed action to
maintain its security within and without. The “liberation”
struggle progresses through three strategic phases, which are
6

quite logical. Initially, the revolutionary movement will be on the
defensive, then achieve stalemate, and finally go on the offensive.
During each phase, a particular form of warfare will drive the
dynamic, though not necessarily quantitatively. During the
strategic defensive, terror and guerrilla actions will lead. During
the strategic stalemate, mobile warfare (also called maneuver
warfare) will be dominant. This will see insurgent “main force”
units, equivalents of government formations, take the field but
not seek to hold territory. The final phase, the strategic offensive,
will see such seizure of ground, the so-called “war of position.”
The CPN(M) felt it was entering Phase 2 with its general offensive
(November 2001). This was then solidified through the actions
which led to government reverses.14
• Political Warfare: using nonviolent methods, such as participation
in legal political activity or negotiations, as an adjunct to
violence.
CPN(M) has emphasized that it favors a “political solution” to
the issues in dispute, by which it appears to mean it is open to
negotiating the terms whereby the old-order will disassemble
itself. The Maoists used their earlier participation in “peace
talks” as a cover for military preparations prior to launching
their November 2001 general offensive. There is a possibility the
recent ceasefire was used in a like-manner, but this is not clear,
since the Maoists saw themselves as negotiating from a position
of strength.15
• International Action: Though not a salient element during the
Chinese Civil War itself, this had become ever more prominent
as people’s war has developed. In conflicts such as the war of
liberation in Algeria by the FLN and the insurgency of the Viet
Cong in the Vietnam War, international pressure upon the
counterinsurgents played a decisive role.
The CPN(M) recognized early that in South Asia and within
Western society it had allies: Maoist bodies yet committed,
7

whatever the outcome of the Cold War, to radical restructuring
along the lines advocated by the so-called “Gang of Four,” the key
adherents to radical Maoism. To that end, regular coordination
was effected in the West with the constituent members of
the Maoist umbrella group, Revolutionary Internationalist
Movement (RIM); they provided a variety of services, such as
seeking to block assistance to the Nepalese government. Closer
to home, a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and
Organisations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) was created in July
2001 after a meeting of nine South Asian Maoist parties in West
Bengal.16
In implementing this approach, the CPN(M) examined the
numerous “people’s war” struggles which had been carried out in
the post-World War II era. The two insurgencies which exercised
the most influence early on were Shining Path in Peru,17 already
mentioned, and the so-called “Naxalites,” or Indian Maoists.18
Shining Path is fairly well-known in the West. Its extraordinary
level of violence had Lima on the verge of collapse by 1992, when
the capture of the leadership, combined with an array of other
counterinsurgency moves, all but destroyed the movement. The
Naxalite phenomenon, though a virtual icon among international
leftists, is less known among scholars. It began as a minor Maoistinspired upheaval in 1967 in the small Indian district of Naxalburi,
which sits up against Nepal’s southeastern border, was snuffed out,
but then revived in “copycat” left wing upheavals throughout India,
some of which eventually required deployment of the military.
Remnants remain active in at least six Indian states.19
Significantly, what both of these key influences share is that they
are distinguished by their brutality. Mao himself did not shy away
from violence against class enemies but held that only the most
die-hard elements would have to be “struggled” to the extreme;
i.e., killed. Most opponents could be neutralized and brought into
support of the revolutionary endeavor through the mechanisms
of the united front. Neither Sendero nor the Naxalites followed this
approach, instead taking “elimination of class enemies” as a literal
charge for action. The result was an impressive level of terror,
with actual numbers being much greater in the Peruvian case. The
8

practical result was that the CPN(M) initially looked for inspiration
to two of the more radical insurgent movements to have appeared in
recent years.
There is some irony in this, since the CPN(M)’s leadership, like
that of both Sendero and the Naxalites (not to mention the Khmer
Rouge, another Maoist group which adopted extreme violence), is
drawn overwhelmingly from the very “class enemies” attacked by
the party’s doctrine. The two key figures in the 9-man Politburo,
Pushba Kamal Dahal, “Prachanda,” and Baburam Bhattarai, for
instance, are both Brahmins with educational backgrounds.20 (The
party’s Military Wing head, Ram Bahadur Thapa, “Badal,” is
apparently ethnic Magar and hence an exception.)
That leaders of a revolutionary movement should come from
the elite is consistent with global patterns, whether insurgent or
terrorist, throughout the 20th and now 21st centuries. So, too, is the
prominence of leadership figures with an educational background.21
Followers, as might be expected, are drawn from altogether different
strata, the marginalized of society, those who become the so-called
“grievance guerrillas.” That the CPN(M) has had little difficulty
tapping such individuals stems from the abundance of socioeconomic-political contradictions discussed earlier compounded
by issues of gender. Women have been prominent in the recruiting
profile.22
Prior to going underground and becoming illegal, prominent
members of what is now the CPN(M), guided by their “progressive”
ideology, focused their political efforts among just such strata, even
sending a number of representatives to Parliament in the early period
of transition to democracy.23 The areas of this electoral strength, the
same Mid-Western Regional hill districts which form the subject of
so much development literature, remain the Maoist heartland.
Organizationally, there is nothing unexpected in the CPN(M)’s
approach in those areas. Using the mass line in areas where they are
present in strength, the united front in areas of government presence
(especially urban centers), cadre have emphasized winning the
allegiance of the people by tapping into local grievances and then
connecting solutions with membership in the CPN(M). Logically,
this has meant there oftentimes are contradictions between the
subjective pronouncements of Maoist publications and objective
9

realities on the ground.24 Where the population has hesitated, terror
has been used to ensure compliance. This increasingly has been the
case as the party has moved out of the areas where it previously
had an electoral base. Statistical analysis of casualties shows a nearmajority to be upper caste victims, an expected result in a society
where those castes are dominant.25
As a mass base is mobilized, it is incorporated into a clandestine
infrastructure, the alternative society of the CPN(M). This structure
to date has essentially replicated that of the government, merely
standing up a radical alternative. In at least six Mid-Western
districts, government presence is now limited to only the district
capitals, so the Maoists are effectively the ruling structure. The
Politburo issues directives with the assistance of an approximately
25-member Central Committee. The precise relationship between
this infrastructure and the so-called “Military Wing” is a matter of
some conjecture, but the degree of independence ostensibly enjoyed
by the latter from the party is undoubtedly overemphasized.26 The
main armed component, for instance, six guerrilla battalions, may
only launch military action in response to instructions relayed
through their individual Chief Commissars (one per battalion),
who are Central Committee members.27 Similarly, the united front
apparatus, while also existing as a separate entity, appears to be
under firm party control.28
Leaders and followers, then, are mobilized, in the final analysis,
by the same “causes,” but approach the issues quite differently.
Leaders, drawn overwhelmingly, even at this point in time, from
elite strata, seek structural change to deal with issues. Followers,
while also seeking solution, want direct, local redress.29 Preliminary
systemic response involved sending ill-prepared police, both from
local stations and regional response units, into affected areas, where
their behavior, actual and perceived,30 thrust self-defense into the
equation as a major theme for Maoist recruitment.31
The heartland of the early Maoist position was the area straddling
either side of the border between the districts of Rolpa and Rukkum
in the Mid-Western Region. There, Kham Magars responded to
CPN(M) guidance and became guerrillas generally supported by the
population.32 Further expansion proved more difficult, and the level
of popular involvement was commensurately lower. Indeed, even as
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the Maoists were able to dominate the six districts in the Mid-Western
regional heartland, an area as near to the epicenter of the uprising as
western Rolpa, Gharti Magar territory, witnessed infrastructure so
thin that mere handfuls of cadres maintained control only through
their ability to call upon guerrilla manpower for enforcement of their
writ.33
Though the Maoists themselves did not claim as “base areas” the
human terrain they thus were able to dominate, the districts in the
Mid-Western Region served that role as outlined in key “people’s
war” documents authored by Mao Tse-tung. Within them, social
transformation could serve as a basis for popular mobilization, with
the result that the movement could project itself outward into new
areas. Necessarily, a contradiction glossed over in Maoist theoretical
literature emerged for the CPN(M) in terms of resources, because
the base areas were among the very poorest regions in the country―
due not to the issues of exploitation posited in party literature but
for more mundane reasons of overpopulation, poor techniques
of agriculture and animal husbandry, and limited soil and water
regimes. The result was the relative absence of the sort of social
engineering one would expect to find in a “liberated area”―and very
limited resources available to the liberation movement.
In the absence of external input, as provided, for instance, by
drugs in the cases of FARC in Colombia and Sendero Luminoso in
Peru, CPN(M) was forced to rely upon the more traditional but
limited insurgent methodology of criminal activity, especially bankrobbing, kidnapping-for-ransom, and extortion,34 for generation of
funds. These, though they could at times produce windfalls, were
not able to meet the demands of rapid expansion.35 Neither could
external links make up shortfalls, since the allied movements of
CCOMPOSA were actually in an inferior position logistically to
their Nepalese compatriots. These stark realities left the movement
with a character, in many areas, as much jacquerie as disciplined
insurgency.
Dynamics of “People’s War.”
Progress thus was steady but more a product of government lack
of capacity than insurgent power. Methodology was predictable
11

and mirrored that of other insurgent movements following the
people’s war approach. While “winning the hearts and minds” was
important in the base areas, terror was indispensable for expansion
into contested populations. This was supplemented by guerrilla
action and ultimately, with the launching of the November 2001
general offensive, the mobile warfare phase.
The basic pattern of mobile warfare may be conceptualized
thus: Terror facilitates or establishes the “space” necessary for the
insurgent political campaign. It eliminates societal rallying points,
the synapses such as local gentry and minor government officials.
Terror further generates demands for protection. Answering this
demand, police forces respond. Once they predictably spread
out, they are attacked in guerrilla actions, with small patrols and
stations overwhelmed. Unable to defend themselves, the police
invariably consolidate forces, thus exposing still larger swaths of
the population to insurgent domination. Behind the scenes, certain
guerrilla units (i.e., a proportion of guerrilla combatant strength) are
“regularized,” to use Mao’s term, turned into mobile warfare units―
“main force” guerrilla units. They are “conventional” but only in
the sense of established tables of organization and equipment (TOE)
and specialization. When the government inevitably deploys its
military to reclaim “lost” areas, these units (normally the army) find
themselves, first, harassed by guerrilla action, which demands small
unit saturation patrolling, then, defeated in detail by the mobile
warfare units (which fight using “guerrilla tactics”).36
Doctrinally, political cadre should enter an area and gradually
mobilize clandestine infrastructure which produces violent action.
Some movements, such as the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and Sendero Luminoso itself prior to its 1980 declaration
of people’s war, have essentially followed this approach. More
common, though, as illustrated by the Naxalites in India and FARC
in Colombia, is to lead with violence, “capturing” a target population
and then reorganizing it according to ideological dictate. This is the
approach CPN(M) has relied upon since 1996.
In a typical action, in Muchook, a small village 4 hours walk from
the district capital of Gorkha (the capital is also Gorkha), a Congress
Party representative and Maoist opponent, a “big landlord” (two
hectares), was awakened at 2230 by a knock on his door. Confronted
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by seven Maoists, armed principally with agricultural implements,
he was dragged from his home and told he was to be made “to
suffer the way you made the people suffer.” His legs and feet were
then systematically broken with hammers. Carried to a hospital in
Kathmandu, he survived, but his absence deprived the village of a
natural rallying point, for there existed no government presence in
Muchook, no police station, for example. Police who did venture to
the area found nothing, but they could not stay, and so the Maoists
effectively took control of the village and its surrounding area, one
of Nepal’s 3,913 basic building blocks, or VDC.
This process was repeated time and again. Complementary moves
were carried out to neutralize completely the state. District and VDC
offices, for example, were systematically razed, their records and
equipment destroyed. In Gorkha, the single month-and-a-half period
prior to May 2002 saw 34 of the district’s 66 VDC offices completely
eliminated. The 60-odd police stations, with their approximately 500
men spread out over the size of a U.S. county (3,610 sq-km), with
more than a quarter of a million people to cover and no real means
to do so save on foot (the only paved road in the district connected
Gorkha town to Kathmandu), were helpless.37 Nationwide, then,
by the beginning of 2003, more than 1,400 VDCs no longer existed;
and virtually all no longer functioned, their personnel, elected
locally, having almost universally fled.38 The influence of terror
was illustrated by the reality that fewer than 30 VDC Chairmen had
actually been assassinated (again, of a theoretical 3,913 total).39
All other elements of the state likewise found themselves
attacked. Roads were cut; bridges, dams and hydropower facilities,
aqueducts, telephone towers and electric lines, and airport control
towers were systematically destroyed. By the same early-2003 date
noted above, more than 440 post offices, most but rudimentary
facilities, had been gutted.40
Such action was the essence of the approach of Sendero Luminoso
(which Nepalese Maoist documents claimed to be copying
consciously) and the Khmer Rouge.41 To all appearances, the goal
was to sever links with the existing system, isolate the population
into a self-contained entity, and return society to the proverbial
revolutionary “Year One,” when the remaking of the new world
would begin. The guide for this transformation was to be the
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thoughts and dictums of the leader, “Prachanda Path,” a deliberate
echoing of Sendero Luminoso’s “Gonzalo Path” (“President Gonzalo”
was party leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso).
Though the essence of the campaign was rural-based, as would
be expected from the “people’s war” approach (as it had evolved,
particularly through the Vietnam War experience), urban action
was not eschewed. Just as Sendero eventually extended its campaign
into urban space, so did the CPN(M). Such areas, in any case, were
limited in Nepal, so the main targets were the three most important
cities and their surrounding productive lands: Kathmandu, the
capital; Pokhara, to the west, on the doorstep of the Mid-Western
Region; and Nepalgunj in the tarai. There, united front activity of the
CPN(M)’s United Revolutionary People’s Council (URPC) was most
important, supplemented by a terror campaign of bombings and
assassinations initiated in August 2002.42 The most prominent victim
was Inspector General of Police (IGP) Mohan Shrestha, commanding
officer of the police field force (Armed Police Force or APF), killed in
January 2003.
Even as terror forced society in upon itself, the principal target
of guerrilla action was the 46,500-man police force, the first line of
armed defense―for Nepal possessed no local forces of any kind.43
An essentially unarmed “watcher” force, two-thirds of whom
carried nothing heavier than a patrol stick, the police were quite
unprepared for the demands of counterinsurgency. Emergency
response units, who in any case were armed with the 1941 version of
the .303 Lee Enfield (a bolt action rifle), were likewise found lacking.
Patrols sent to the scenes of incidents were ambushed; numerous
small police stations were overrun, attacked in the dead of night in
assaults initiated with homemade explosives, then overwhelmed by
human wave assaults. Efforts to stand up a more properly armed
and equipped APF of 15,000 men44 made slow progress under the
pressure of operational demands. By January 2003, the Civil Police
had suffered 985 dead, the APF, 108 dead.45
Predictably, the only possible police response was to abandon
outlying stations and consolidate in defensible mass. In the hills,
where terrain, lack of communication, and difficulty of movement
favored the guerrillas, this process was inexorable across the entire
breadth of the country. Rolpa, in the insurgent heartland, was
14

typical.46 In 1996, there were 33 stations in the district, with the
largest but 75 men, most less than 20.47 When the post at Ghartigaun
in western Rolpa was attacked in 1999, for example, it had a
complement of 19. Fifteen were killed, the others wounded; the
station was totally destroyed and not regarrisoned. In 1998, two such
stations were abandoned; in 1999, a further 16; in 2000, six more; in
2001, another four; and in 2002, three―leaving a total of just two for
the entire population of nearly 211,000.48
Such was the lack of national integration that, once the police
presence was eliminated, the insurgents became the state. All that
remained to serve as a reminder of far-off Kathmandu were the
minor functionaries, who could not flee lest they lose their meager
salaries: the likes of teachers, postmen, and VDC personnel. Heads
of VDCs, as mentioned previously, almost universally fled;49 but
school staffs and postmen generally stayed. Had the approach of
Sendero, the Naxalites, or the Khmer Rouge remained the dominant
ethos of the Maoists, not only would one expect such personnel to be
eliminated but a new order instituted. Allowing for local exceptions,
this was not the case. Indeed, in most areas, once the initial spasm
of destruction had been completed, it ended―with comparatively
lower levels of destruction in those areas where the Maoists held
sway and made use of facilities, such as VDC offices. Land was not
systematically seized or redistributed, and even schools were not
directed to change the normal, centrally determined curriculum
(though private schools were generally closed). Maoist combatants
carried out civic action projects of sorts (such as improving trails and
constructing bridges) even as government development personnel―
charged with doing the same tasks―were refused entry. Only in
those core areas of longstanding insurgent presence did anything
“new” surface, though various people’s governments and projects,
in reality, were but efforts to make earlier forms more equitable and
responsive.
The critical component at the local level, of course, was the cadres.
These, too, were remarkably uneven in quality and presence. It
would be expected that the level of ideological knowledge would be
low among movement “followers,” but this generally has proved the
case for the cadres, as well. Participation in the movement resulted
from a variety of local and personal factors,50 and cadres generally
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did their best to reproduce the procedures and symbology of the
movement; but outside the core areas, they held sway only through
terror, through their ability to call upon guerrilla formations to act as
enforcers.51
This reality revealed a peculiarity noticed by virtually all
observers: the dependence of the Maoist campaign upon tribal
manpower, especially Magars. That guerrilla formations were
dominated numerically by Magars stemmed from the ethnic
composition of the core areas in which the Maoists had long
worked, such as the Rukkum-Rolpa border corridor. That entire
tribal communities would become involved in the insurgency was
predictable once government miscues allowed the CPN(M) to tap
the self-defense dynamic. A staple of Maoist agitprop in such areas
remains skits featuring blue-clad “policemen” burning villages
and brutalizing the villagers, only to be routed by them under the
leadership of the party. That tribal links were being exploited was
further illustrated by Magar dominance of guerrilla formations as
far away from the core Mid-Western areas as Dolakha District, the
“Rolpa of the East,”52 where Magars were less than 2 percent of the
population (as per census).53
If this dynamic fingered the CPN(M), in a sense, as a tribal
revolt, a different process was at work in more mixed areas. In these,
cadres were the movement, and they, as indicated, were a product
of local realities and thus of mixed ethnic and class composition.
Though they did participate directly in terror actions, especially in
villages targeted for movement expansion, within their own areas
of responsibility, they were more likely to call upon outsiders, the
guerrillas.54
These guerrillas, who initially were in small units, eventually
(certainly by early 2003) were overwhelmingly assigned to six main
force units, battalion facsimiles of 400-600 men each. Single battalions
were found in the Eastern and Central Zones (as per the Maoist
framework), four battalions in the Western Zone.55 Their weaponry
was similar to that possessed by the Nepalese government, a mix of
the old and the new. The latter were primarily captured pieces and
those bought on the black market using looted funds.56 For training,
ex-servicemen were both coerced and hired.
Even were terror not the most salient issue in the minds of
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villagers, contact between them and the guerrillas would be a
recurring factor in life, since the combatants depend upon the
villagers for the necessities of life. All movement, for instance, must
occur through the preparation of caches of necessities, ranging
from food and water to firewood, and such activity occurs through
orders issued to villagers by the cadres at the behest of the guerrilla
chain-of-command. Similarly, mandatory attendance by villagers
at political rallies is enforced by the combatants, with the cadres
issuing the orders and fingering those who resist or malinger.
The end product is a high level of popular fear but an inability to
do anything save reach accommodation―unless flight is adopted as
a course of action. At the time of the ceasefire, a growing number of
villagers appeared to be opting for this choice.57
Systemic Response to the Maoist Challenge.
Only with the November 2001 general offensive by the Maoists
did Nepal take the necessary step of reinforcing the overwhelmed
police force by committing the 54,000 troops of the Royal Nepalese
Army (RNA)58 and passing anti-terrorism legislation. Spread
throughout areas of the country which could be reached by road,
quartered in battalion but more often company cantonments, the
RNA was a largely ceremonial force better known for its contribution
to UN peacekeeping missions than for martial prowess. Indeed,
even companies did not deploy as such. The result was a number of
serious reverses as the RNA went through the painful transformation
required for dealing with guerrilla warfare. In several instances,
company-equivalents were overrun. By January 2003, the RNA had
suffered 244 dead and 345 wounded.59
Faced with the Maoist campaign, the Nepalese state reeled.
Though the number of dead was not as severe as that of many
other insurgencies―the highest total figures for the entire period,
February 13, 1996, to the present, are put at some 8,00060―they were
concentrated in the year-plus which followed November 2001. A
majority of all war dead, therefore, came in the space of just over a
year, a powerful shock to Nepal.61
Response was hampered by the political shortcomings already
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detailed. Not only did governments change with startling rapidity,
on average one per year, but governance was only possible due
to the formation of various intra- and even inter-party coalitions.
Self-interest was the order of the day, illustrated by rampant
corruption, and administrative drift meant than even substantial
foreign development assistance was not incorporated in a systematic
manner. The appearance of an insurgency, therefore, was seen as but
one more minor factor among many and parceled out to the security
forces for action, which in pre-November 2001 meant to the police.
Under some enlightened commanders, local police operations
could have passed for those that had proved successful for the British
in Malaya. Others, though, were more repression than development
in thrust. One advantage for the state was that numerous individuals,
both civilians and security force, had served abroad with the United
Nations in peacekeeping situations.62 Thus they were well-versed
in the “hearts and minds” approach to internal pacification as
opposed to pure repression. It was in a sense predictable, then, that
approximately a year before the Maoist general offensive, the RNA,
though still in its barracks as concerned stability operations, was
nevertheless deployed in limited fashion in support of a government
Integrated Security and Development Program (ISDP).
The RNA, it was intended, would serve as the security shield
for bringing government presence to underdeveloped areas, which
would then see an interjection of activity designed to improve
conditions and promote livelihood. As matters worked out, the RNA
was the only element of the government which actually fulfilled its
role. Though six districts were designated, with Gorkha as the pilot
project, and RNA battalions deployed in area domination patrols,
the civilian input was limited to selection of the projects by local
government bodies. The result was that the RNA itself used its
limited assets to build roads, dig wells, and provide rudimentary
medical attention to villagers. Yet none of this was done on a scale
which made the slightest difference in the actual situation on the
ground.63
With the November 2001 offensive, the ISDP was suspended,
and the RNA deployed to engage in area domination. The highest
formation for command and control was the brigade, but this
gradually gave way to divisions and a planned corps, both of
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these more area commands than deployable military entities. Solid
individual training could not be channeled into results-oriented
operations due to shortfalls of arms and equipment, as well as severe
shortcomings in leadership and technical skills.
A critical weakness was intelligence, the linchpin of any
counterinsurgency effort. Nepal’s various sources for information
gathering and processing―the police, APF, RNA, and National
Investigation Department (NID)―were quite unprepared for the
demands of internal war and generally deficient in both information
gathering and intelligence production/dissemination.64 Exacerbating
the situation, these bodies functioned as separate entities with little
coordination or data sharing. Only at the very highest levels of the
bureaucracy was raw input brought together for analysis, but this,
too, was provided for in an ad hoc and undermanned fashion.65
Still, dramatic strides were made in standing up the command
and control architecture necessary for counterinsurgency. With the
Prime Minister in the lead role, the National Security Council was
charged with actually prosecuting the campaign. Because the council
itself consisted of top government leaders, its Executive Secretariat
undertook planning and coordination tasks. At various levels, but
especially in the districts, coordinating committees―comprised of
the local police, RNA, civil, and intelligence representatives―met
to determine policy and implementation. A unified command,
with the RNA having authority over all elements of the armed
response, eventually came into existence, giving fiber to the ad hoc
but functioning coordination cells that had been formed at RNA
headquarters. APF platoons were deployed as if they were “light”
RNA units, and the police were given primacy in the defense of most
urban areas.66
But difficulties occurred in overcoming the substantial baggage
of past political inadequacies. The police, for instance, were not
trusted by the RNA, being seen as corrupt, inefficient, and bullyboys
for the ruling party, which normally had been the Nepali Congress.
The new APF, in turn, had received a good portion of its initial
manpower draft from various Nepali Congress youth groups and
so likewise was not trusted by either the Civil Police―who did have
a good many within the officer corps who were well-trained and
had substantial experience―or the RNA. For its part, the RNA was
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viewed as loyal first and foremost to the palace and as a possible
threat to fledging democracy. A highly centralized decisionmaking
machinery meant that even the best of motives could often not
overcome bureaucratic inertia or implement decisions when they
were forthcoming.
Foreign support hence became crucial in addressing these flaws.
Britain, as might be expected from its long and deep involvement
in Nepal, played an important role in training of all sorts. India,
concerned lest it see another security headache develop on a crucial
border (Nepal was a buffer between New Delhi and Beijing),
responded initially with training and material support, eventually
moving vigorously to suppress substantial Maoist activity within
India’s own borders. Ironically, China, having moved in its foreign
policy beyond supporting “Maoist insurgents,” also provided
equipment. Finally, the United States, which long had been a
major development actor through its U.S. Agency for International
Development (AID), moved vigorously in all areas, from supplying
arms and equipment to training. An emergency appropriation
brought the combined military aid (Foreign Military Financing)
for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003 (FY02/FY03) to US$17 million.
Assessment teams from all three of the countries just named (absent
China) were supplemented by personnel for actual training, to
include U.S. Special Forces.
Where no amount of foreign input could compensate, though,
was in overcoming the shortcomings of a traditional system, which
organizationally manifested themselves in extreme deference to
authority and a consequent lack of initiative. Such, combined with
the intelligence problems cited above, resulted in a failure to tackle
the struggle operationally and tactically―even as general strategic
grasp of overall parameters could be judged reasonably accurate.
While it was understood with considerable clarity how socioeconomic-political shortcomings had produced the insurgency, it
was not grasped how to respond.67 Consequently, a comparatively
weak insurgent movement, which drew its combatant strength
from minimally armed tribal revolt and could expand beyond core
regions only through terror orchestrated by voluntarist action, was
allowed to go unchecked for want of application of any systematic
counter.
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Further, even as this uncoordinated, haphazard, armed response
moved forward, political realities made a bad situation worse.
Virtually the entire post-November 2001 period saw the government
in a state of crisis, with the Nepali Congress splitting into two rival
factions, and the UML reportedly refusing to accept the reigns of
government. Finally, in October 2002, circumstances became so
bad that the King, using extraordinary powers granted to him by
the Constitution―but highly controversial nevertheless―disbanded
Parliament and appointed a government made up predominantly
of members from minority political parties.68 As the King’s own
legitimacy was not secure, this made the government’s even less
so, and the ousted parties wasted no time in endeavoring to test
through mass action the staying power of the new administration.
So tainted were the political parties by their own corruption and
ineptness, though, that they were unable to rally a viable challenge.
The Maoists chose this moment to offer, in January 2003, a ceasefire
and renewed negotiations. The reason already had been provided by
Bhatarrai in December 2002: “The situation is now peaking towards
a climax after the fratricidal and regicidal ‘king,’ Gyanendra, and his
notorious son, Paras, have staged a retrogressive coup d’etat against
the supine parliamentary democracy on October 4 and restored
autocratic monarchy in the country.”69 Such vitriol notwithstanding,
the country eagerly embraced the proffered respite.70
Earlier negotiations, as detailed above, had been unilaterally
terminated by the CPN(M) in November 2001 in order to go over
to the offensive. Yet links had never been broken. The UML, in
particular, because its stated ideology continued to incorporate
the notion of “revolution,” had kept channels of communication
open, as had any number of other actors. Human rights groups, for
instance, endeavored to act as mediators. Eventually, these channels
were used by the palace and its appointed government to renew
discussions. Just how these would fare remained anyone’s guess,
because neither side showed any sign of altering its basic positions.
These, to be clear, were irreconcilable on such basics as the nature of
the state and the position of the monarchy. Both sides continued to
train, re-equip, and acquire armaments.
In this situation, the Maoist position was of most moment. From
the previous ceasefire, captured documents and pictures, to include
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video footage, together with interrogations of prisoners, showed
cadres telling the mass base that negotiations were but a tactical
gambit, that the cause of the revolution would never be betrayed
or given up until a “people’s republic” was established. The real
question was whether the new talks were seen by the party as but a
pause for regrouping or a more serious effort to gain by nonviolent
means that which thus far it had been unable to gain through
violence; a standard political warfare technique, to be sure, but one
that did not produce the level of societal dislocation attending the
Maoists’ effort to become, to borrow a phrase, “the New Sendero.”
Significantly, the latter course seemed likely, with the CPN(M)―
in its own calculations―moving from a position of strength into
fractured Nepali politics. Analysis, however, pointed to two possible
interpretations of Maoist designs.
• “The Leninist Scenario”: The CPN(M), given the circumstances,
felt it could not lose and would be able to defeat the enemy in
detail, much as Lenin did in the chaos between the ouster of
the Czar and the final Bolshevik coup.71 Directly and through
its front organizations, as in 2001, it aggressively used political
space, within which it could operate freely, to further divide
its foes. In closed-door meetings, it made common cause with
both the political parties and the monarchy (through the sitting
government), the end-game being to use one against the other,
then to out-maneuver the survivor in the organizational contest
to follow. Crucial in this strategy was the “constituent assembly,”
through which the monarchy was to be neutralized, in particular
separated from its armed base, the RNA―in the name of
establishing a “republic.” Integration of the CPN(M) combatants,
as was demanded, would further ensure the inability of the
RNA to respond to provocation. In such an environment, cooptation would serve in place of armed confrontation. Indeed,
the CNP(M)’s “75 Points”72 were structured as such a multitude
precisely so that no one or minor grouping was objectionable. It
was the totality of the platform, to be achieved by persistently
emphasizing that the smaller, “moderate”73 compromises
provided the only route to a “lasting peace,” that was intended
to produce a totally transformed whole.
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• “The PIRA Scenario”: The CPN(M) had not changed its basic
positions but, like the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA)
in Northern Ireland, saw the moment as ripe for pushing ahead
with nonviolent means even as violence was held in reserve.74
This formulation was theoretically of particular interest, because
it held that a substate actor held the same rights as the state.
In particular, the state was no longer granted a monopoly of
legitimate force. To the contrary, having lost this status by
illegitimate action, the state, it was claimed, had to negotiate
with the substate actor―which had access to its own purportedly
legitimate force. Hence the Maoists claimed to have emerged,
through the use of violence, as an equal to the Nepalese state. The
state controlled the urban areas, argued the CPN(M), the substate
actor controlled the rural areas. The clash between the thesis and
antithesis, hitherto a violent affair, had given rise to the demand
for the realization of a new synthesis through nonviolent
negotiation. Violence had been necessary to arrive at the point of
“political solution,” but violence could be superseded by political
warfare. The destruction wreaked principally in the hinterland,
therefore, though having various tactical and operational goals,
such as area domination, strategically was intended as political
communication, irrefutable evidence for the old-order that the
CPN(M) was a force that could not be ignored.75 No doubt of
marginal interest to those affected, such a mindset would not be
that of Sendero Luminoso or the Khmer Rouge but of PIRA: not
the destruction of the old-regime in all its manifestations but
destruction utilized as a weapon―to inflict pain to achieve the
“political solution.”
Neither of these two interpretations would have precluded
inclusion by the Maoists of more immediate concerns, though
Bhattarai, as the head of the Maoist negotiations team, emphasized
that the CPN(M)’s “75 Points” was a document of strategic goals
rather than tactical demands. He claimed for the Party a willingness
to accept intermediate steps (e.g., a “bourgeois republic” with a
constitutional monarchy), a determination to move beyond an early
attraction for the approach of Sendero Luminoso or the Naxalites in
order to arrive at a unique, situationally-appropriate “Nepalese
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Maoism.”76 Specifics of application for the building of a new Nepal
were to be found in an expansion of Bhattarai’s Ph.D. dissertation
released in May 2003.77
Even if this formulation were accepted at face value, there were
grounds for pessimism. Maoist excessive rhetoric, especially attacks
upon the RNA, and a bargaining emphasis upon broad, often utopian,
declarations at the expense of specifics, soon led to a situation where
the two sides talked past each other. Undoubtedly, the RNA saw
little but a cynical effort to weaken it. In the field, Maoist cadres and
combatants had been briefed that the major goal of the new round
of talks was the “national army.”78 Simultaneously, the Maoist
representatives in Kathmandu focused upon ending international
assistance to the government (which, as indicated above, has been
crucial in enhancing the capabilities of the security forces), all the
while demanding an RNA “return to barracks.” Under no such
restrictions themselves, Maoist forces continued to move and train,
funded by undiminished criminal activity.
Further, unsure of their position vis-à-vis Nepal’s international
supporters in the era of the U.S.-led “War on Terrorism” (WOT), the
Maoists stridently attacked them, in particular the United States.
This furthered the impression of Machiavellian maneuvering,
though it would seem more correct to find the inspiration for such
CPN(M) verbiage in the party’s parochial origins and operational
environment. Put simply, the Maoists had a painfully limited
understanding of the global forces and processes presently in
play.79 This lead to a degree of paranoia and mistaken bargaining
positions.
It should be further noted here that the representatives of the
CPN(M) present in Kathmandu were among the most worldly
and well-educated in the Party. This lead to questions as to both
the scope of their authority and the degree to which their positions
accurately reflect those of the entire leadership. Though CPN(M)
decisionmaking is apparently a collective enterprise, Prachanda
dominates through majority support in the Politburo. His views―
especially concerning the extent to which compromise may be
exercised in negotiations―were not known―despite the claim by
Bhattarai that he and his peers were but a reflection of the party
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will.
The difficulty of the situation was compounded by the movement,
in May 2003, of the estranged political parties into a phase of active
resistance against the state―which led to the resignation of the first
“caretaker” government in June and its replacement by a follow-on
administration. Though the parties continued to voice support for a
favorable outcome in the government/CPN(M) negotiations, they
committed their own efforts completely to confrontation with the
palace and its appointed government. This action, the Maoists joined
but haltingly, instead focusing upon using their fronts to increase
dramatically their influence within what hitherto had been the
government’s rear area.
In such an environment, the only real surprise came when the
Maoists, on August 27, 2003, abruptly terminated the ceasefire
and resorted again to a variety of armed actions, to include
targeted assassinations against important government personnel
in Kathmandu. The surprise came from the obvious: government
disorientation and lack of focus seemed to be providing the
CPN(M) with ample leeway to make progress, through “political”
means, progress that would surely be more difficult in a state of
armed conflict. Indeed, faced with renewed Maoist assassination
efforts, the government promptly restored legal prohibitions and
asked international organizations for assistance in apprehending
leadership figures. Thus “people’s war” is again in full swing.
Recommendations.
As the situation has lurched from crisis to crisis, the concern of
external powers has grown commensurately, particularly that of
the United States. For the dangers of peripheral areas that come to
be dominated by hostile, radical actors have been driven home to
Washington by cases as diverse as Afghanistan, northwest Pakistan,
Yemen, Georgia, Jammu and Kashmir, Colombia, and the southern
Philippines. The latter two have been particular examples of the role
tardy or misdirected U.S. action can play in allowing a local situation
to grow into a security threat to us. Lest Nepal prove similar, it is
imperative that Washington proceed with an adroit mixture of
reasoned advice and adequate material support and training. Given
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the nature of the foe, the existing U.S. military role seems destined to
increase in prominence.
To improve its position, Kathmandu should logically look to the
following (with U.S. input as appropriate):
• National mobilization is necessary, as appropriate for grappling
with the most serious crisis to confront Nepal since its transition
to democracy in 1990-91. No matter how serious that earlier
upheaval, it pales in scope and casualties to what presently
is occurring. Yet the counterinsurgency remains essentially a
matter delegated to the security forces. There are, for instance, no
local forces of any sort. Neither, at the other end of the spectrum,
has there been a clear articulation of “why we fight.”
• A key component in this national response must be a strategic
plan, with operational components delimited and responsibilities
assigned. This will necessarily involve all elements of national
power and drive a multifaceted, coordinated response to the
insurgency. Jointness is critical, but thus far even the police have
been marginalized, much less civilian components of the state.
The heart of the plan must be domination of human terrain rather
than focus upon insurgent combatants. Local security remains
the key to restoration of normalcy.
• Socio-economic-political reform must assume pride of place
in any such plan. Though the operational driving force behind
insurgent expansion is provided by terror, it is the strategic
environment of the failed state that is Nepal which has thrown
up the historic moment the Maoists seek to exploit. Democracy
has been corrupt and ineffective, the political class distracted and
self-absorbed. Consequences in the economic and social spheres
have consequently been exacerbated. Leadership must set in
place solutions that can provide the inspiration for mobilization.
• Intelligence must continue to improve, with greater emphasis
placed upon coordination and timely dissemination. Basic
analytical techniques appropriate to internal war in a lowtech environment will provide a foundation upon which other
capabilities can be built. Nature of the battle space and of the
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insurgents, though, dictates that human intelligence (HUMINT)
must be the dominant activity.
• Information warfare (IW) must be moved from its current
unfocused, weak state to the status of force-multiplier. Generally
favorable disposition towards the system by the populace
demands this, even as the insurgents provide the human material
for their own demise by continuing to rely upon terror as the
lynchpin of their campaign. The only meaningful IW activity is
coming from the RNA. This must be elevated to a government
activity.
• Special Operations capabilities must be made more robust and
integrated into the overall approach. Present arrangements are
ad hoc. They are decentralized due to the lack of mobility assets
but have not been utilized in the most appropriate manner. Deep
penetration reconnaissance, running of pseudo-gangs, and direct
action have all been successful but uncoordinated and reactive.
• Leadership and other skills at all levels must be sharpened as
per the demands of internal war. Doctrine, training particulars,
and basics (to include Rules of Engagement) have not been made
focused or systematic as demanded by the challenge at hand.
Small unit leadership has revolved around hazing rather than
inspiration. Officers frequently are deficient in the rudiments
of tradecraft, much less the mechanics of unit maneuver. Even
rapid overland movement remains a challenge when solutions
are readily available. Nepalis must look to low-tech, indigenous
solutions and not be seduced by the lure of high-tech, expensive
measures and systems―which, in any case, are unavailable.
ENDNOTES
1. For a sympathetic treatment of historical context, see Arjun Karki and
David Seddon, “The People’s War in Historical Context,” in Karki and Seddon,
eds., The People’s War in Nepal: Left Perspectives, Delhi: Adroit Publishers, 2003, pp.
3-48.
2. The closest thing to an “official” figure for the conflict is 7,362 dead as of the
end of 2002, Informal Sector Research & Study Centre (INSEC). See Attachment 1.

27

An updated count through May 12, 2003, raises this slightly to 7,424. Less formal
estimates regularly place the total in the 8,000 range. The latest publication, with
complete statistics for 2002, is Nepal: Human Rights Yearbook 2003, Kathmandu:
INSEC, 2003. Latest data puts the death toll for the single month following August
27, 2003 at astonishing 1,080.
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which placed 35,000 Nepalese in the Indian Army, with over 115,000 receiving
pensions, and 3,500 men in the British establishment, with 26,000 receiving
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8. British presentation to June 2002 Donors Meeting in United Kingdom:
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of the civil service, 98 percent of army officers, 78 percent of political leaders,
including―ironically―the Maoists.” Less dominant figures may be found in the
literature, but even the most favorable see the two upper castes represented in all
major areas in proportion at least double to their societal fraction. Cf. the extensive
data presented in Harka Gurung, especially the tables in the appendices.
9. See, e.g., Martin Hoftun, William Raeper, and John Whelpton, People,
Politics, and Ideology: Democracy and Social Change in Nepal, Kathamndu: Mandala
Book Point, 1999; and Dhruba Kumar, ed., Domestic Conflict and Crisis of
Governability in Nepal, Kathmandu: Centre for Nepal and Asian Studies (CNAS),
Tribhuvan University, 2000. In the latter, Ch. 6, Pancha N. Maharjan, pp. 163-196,
deals specifically with the Maoist challenge and contains a wealth of data.
10. A lasting result was the treaty, signed with the “King of Goorkha,” that
allowed Britain to recruit from certain Nepalese hill tribes for armed service; thus
the Gurkhas.
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11. The Indian political left played an important role in this process. Useful
for what it has to offer concerning later trends discussed in this monograph is
Santwana Tewari Chaube, Democratic Movement in Nepal and the Indian Left, Delhi:
Kalinga Publications, 2001. For a more general discussion of the crucial role
India played ideologically, see D. P. Adhikari, The History of Nepalese Nationalism,
Kathmandu: Jeewan Printing Support Press (personal imprint), 1988.
12. Useful for a discussion of this issue at the local level is Ganga Bahadur, ed.,
Promoting Participatory Democracy in Nepal: An Assessment of Local Self-Governance,
Kathmandu: Political Science Association of Nepal, 1998.
13. The entire royal family was shot and killed by the elder son, angered
at his inability to secure parental consent to marry the woman of his choice.
He subsequently turned his weapon upon himself but did not die immediately,
presenting the country with the bizarre situation where a murderer was, prior to
his death, the crowned king, which occurred even as he was in the intensive care
unit. For further details, see, e.g., Jonathan Gregson, Massacre at the Palace: The
Doomed Royal Dynasty of Nepal, New York: Hyperion, 2002.
14. As stated by Baburam Bhattarai, the CPN(M)’s chief ideologue and the
head of the International Department of the party: “The revolutionary people’s
movement (which is popularly known as People’s War) undergoing for the past
7 years has now created a parallel people’s power, army, economy, and culture in
large parts of the country, except the cities, and a situation of strategic stalemate
has developed in the overall sense.” See interview conducted via the internet by
Chitra Tiwari with Bhattarai, “Maoists Seek a Democratic Nepal,” The Washington
Times, December 14, 2002.
15. Bhattarai in ibid.: “We have always remained amenable to a negotiated
settlement of the problem, but it is the feudal autocratic monarchy that has
sabotaged all our earlier attempts. The ‘ice’ will be hard to break unless the
monarchy is made to realize that its days are now numbered and it has to make a
graceful exit from the stage of history.”
16. From India: Communist Party of India/Marxist-Leninist, People’s War
(or CPI/M-L, PW), based in Andhra Pradesh and known generally as “People’s
War Group” (or PWG); Maoist Communist Centre (or MCC), based in Bihar, the
large Indian state on Nepal’s southern border; the Revolutionary Communist
Centre of India (Maoist); and the Revolutionary Communist Centre of India,
(Marxist-Leninist). From Bangladesh: Bangladesher Samyabadi Dal (M-L); Purbo
Bangla Sarbahara Party (CC); and Purbo Bangla Sarbahara Party (MPK). From
Sri Lanka: the Ceylon Communist Party (Maoist). The ninth attendee, of course,
was the CPN(M) itself. More recently, a Bhutanese Communist Party (MarxistLeninist-Maoist) has emerged and called for “people’s war” to overthrow the
reigning monarchy. This organization is not yet a CCOMPOSA member but can
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be expected to seek such status. Field Notes, May 2003. It remains unclear whether
this hitherto unknown party is an ethnic Bhutanese phenomenon or an outgrow
of CPN(M) efforts to penetrate the ethnic Nepalese community of the country.
The latter has been in a state of turmoil since the late 1980s as a result of official
Bhutanese efforts to promote nationalism through a variety of socio-economicpolitical measures. Cf. Michael Hutt, Unbecoming Citizens: Culture, Nationhood, and
the Flights of Refugees From Bhutan, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2003.
17. Particularly useful in discussing this movement: David Scott Palmer,
ed., The Shining Path of Peru, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992; and “The
Revolutionary Terrorism of Peru’s Shining Path,” in Martha Crenshaw, Terrorism
in Context, University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995, pp.
249-308; Steve J. Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and Society in Peru, 19801995, Durham: Duke University Press, 1998; Gordon H. McCormick, From Sierra to
the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path, Santa Monica: RAND, 1992; and
Gustavo Gorriti, The Shining Path: A History of the Millenarian War in Peru, Chapel
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999. For my own work, see, e.g.,
“Making Revolution: Sendero Luminoso in Peru as Maoist Conclusion, 1980-,”
Ch. 5, in my Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam, London: Frank Cass, 1996, pp. 253284, and “Making Revolution With Shining Path,” Ch. 10, in Palmer, The Shining
Path of Peru, pp. 191-205. Possibly the single most cited essay comparing the cases
of Peru and Nepal is R. Andrew Nickson, “Democratisation and the Growth
of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian Scenario in the Making?” The Journal of
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. XXX/No. 3, November 1992, pp. 358386. I am indebted to Nickson for an elaboration upon the article’s contents during
a discussion in Asuncion, Paraguay, August 15, 1993.
18. Key works include: S. Banerjee, India’s Simmering Revolution: The Naxalite
Uprising, London: Zed Press, 1984; E. Duyker, Tribal Guerrillas: The Santals of West
Bengel and the Naxalite Movement, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987; and A. K.
Samana, Left Extremist Movement in West Bengal: An Experiment in Armed Agrarian
Struggle, Calcutta: Firma KLM, 1984. Particularly good at placing the Naxalites
within regional development context is Partha Chatterjee, The Present History of
West Bengal: Essays in Political Criticism, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
19. To include West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Andhra Pradesh, and
Maharashta. The most vibrant of these are People’s War Group (PWG) of Andhra
Pradesh and the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) of Bihar, both CCOMPOSA
members.
20. Both were born in 1954 and entered politics in their university years.
Prachanda earned a graduate degree (MA) in agriculture; Bhattarai (Ph.D.) in
urban planning; his wife, Hishila Yemi, is an architect/engineer and also a member
of the Maoists. Both have been widely quoted as advocating social transformation
through violence―Bhattarai is credited with the intellectual authorship of the
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“Class Enemy Elimination Campaign” launched in 1996. Asked for personal
details by Tiwari, op.cit., he replied,
As per your query about my individual background, you can
take me as a typical representative of a Third World educated
youth of peasant background, who finds the gross inequality,
oppression, poverty, underdevelopment and exploitation of
the overwhelming majority of the population in a class-divided
and imperialism-dominated world just intolerable, and grasps
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as the best scientific tool to change
it positively.
21. Fieldwork in the important district of Gorkha (from which the term
“Gurkha” is derived) revealed, as per police statistics for the period November
2001-March 2002, that fully 40 percent of those arrested were teachers, 79 of 196.
Field Notes, March 2002.
22. Impressionistic analysis of admittedly incomplete data indicates that onefifth to one-third of the cadre and combatants may be women.
23. Contesting the May 12, 1991, Parliamentary elections as the United
Peoples’ Front of Nepal, or UPFN, the Maoists won nine seats of the 205: one
from the Eastern Region, Siriha; four from the Central Region, Ramechhap,
Kavrepalanchok, Lalitpur, Chitwan; and four from the Mid-Western Region,
Rukkum, Rolpa x 2, Humla. This is a fascinating mix of the some of the most and
least educated areas of the country. By comparison, the Nepali Congress captured
110 seats, the Nepal Communist Party, United Marxist-Leninist, the “legal left,” 69
seats.
24. A “big landlord” in the hills, for instance, may be a man with two
hectares of land; but objectively this does not fit the definition of such. The
point is fundamental, for if the essence of the Nepal’s problems lie, as they do,
in the population exceeding the carrying capacity of the land, no ideological
restructuring can adequately address issues of livelihood. The result is bound to
be, as it was in Cambodia, tragedy.
25. A preliminary analysis of all Maoist civilian victims of terror actions in
2002 produced 323 names, 145 of which could be identified as Brahmin, Chhetri,
or 44.9 percent. Of the remaining 178 names, 52 were tribals (16.1 percent), called
“ethnic community members,” and 82 could not be identified (25.4 percent).
These four categories amounted to 86.4 percent. Victims are virtually all male.
Their numbers are exceeded by the number of security force dead, especially the
police.
26. The tension that does exist appears to stem from a logical source: the
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high proportion of hill tribe manpower in combat formations. Many of these footsoldiers see themselves as involved in a self-defense dynamic as opposed to an
ideological crusade. Thus they must be dealt with carefully by the leadership as it
engages in the tactical maneuvering so typical of a Leninist organization.
27. Field Notes, April-May 2003. This conclusion is based upon numerous
interviews with Maoist combatants in Rolpa. It may be further noted that
each battalion also has a Vice Commissar with equivalent powers to the Chief
Commissar.
28. Student and ethnic liberation groups are most active in the united front
campaign. The latter have not proved particularly vibrant, but the former function
openly and appear to execute instructions issued by the CPN(M) leadership.
Prominent is the All Nepal National Independent Students’ Union, Revolutionary
or ANNISU-R.
29. For the benchmark work of theory with respect to this dynamic, see James
C. Scott, “Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars,” Theory and
Society, Vol. 7/Nos. 1 & 2, January-March 1979, pp. 97-134. Scott, of course, is the
author of the seminal The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in
Southeast Asia, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976.
30. This is an important issue, because the limited scholarly work produced to
date has relied principally upon “circular” journalistic accounts of actual events,
the result being that hearsay has taken on a life of its own. One police operation,
in particular (“Kilo Sierra II,” June 1998) is now consistently cited as mobilizing
hill people in self-defense; but its particulars are normally conflated with other
operations, such as the earlier “Romeo,” November 1995, which are then arrayed
as if a consistent pattern of systemic repression. Examination of contemporaneous
data, though, such as the field reports for “Romeo,” (Field Notes, November 2001)
raises questions as to what occurred objectively―quite a different issue from what
occurred subjectively. Subjective issues can not be ignored and may be crucial in
any insurgency; for instance, what could seem to be limited repression objectively
might nevertheless subjectively be perceived as substantial. Yet consideration,
when dealing with a voluntarist movement, must be given to the possibility that
limited, even unexceptional, actions can be exploited through shrewd ideological
campaign by insurgents.
31. Available figures on CPN(M) strength do not inspire confidence, but
government estimates provided in early 2003 would seem reasonable: 5,500
combatants; 8,000 militia; 4,500 cadres, referred to in Nepalese English as “cahdres”; 33,000 hard core followers; and 200,000 sympathizers.
32. See especially Anne de Sales, “The Kham Magar Country: Between
Ethnic Claims and Maoism,” in David N. Gellner, Resistance and the State: Nepalese
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Experiences, New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2003, pp. 326-57. There are five
separate groupings within the general Magar category.
33. Field work, Rolpa, April-May 2003.
34. Local variations make generalization risky, but extortion, classified by
the Maoists as “revolutionary taxation,” appears “reasonable” in an objective
sense. Small shopkeepers in Rolpa, for instance, have cited payments of NPR 50
per month (about US66 cents); government personnel remaining in “liberated”
areas (e.g., teachers, postmen) pay amounts equal to one day’s wages per month.
NPR 100-200 (US$1.32-$2.64) was often cited by teachers who were making
approximately NPR 7,500 per month, roughly US$98. Reports of excess from
collecting cadres are comparatively rare. In contrast, kidnapping-for-ransom is
common―despite efforts by the Maoist hierarchy to deny such activity―and far
more arbitrary. The amounts frequently are steep by the standards of rural Nepal.
A case, not atypical, in Rolpa involved a small innkeeper held until ransomed by
his family for NPR 30,000, or nearly US$400. He subsequently fled to India, leaving
his family adrift. Field Notes, April-May 2003. Equally lucrative for the movement,
of course, is extortion from businesses associated with the commercial economy. A
typical trekking group of foreigners, for instance, was stopped in October 2001 but
allowed to proceed once the guide had paid NPR 2,000 (about US$26), a normal
amount and an order of magnitude greater than what can be gained in taxing the
impoverished population. In the case just cited, a receipt was issued, and the trek
reported no further demands. Field Notes, December 2001.
35. E.g., government statistics for the first several days of the November 2001
offensive put losses to CPN(M) bank-robberies at some US$2 million. Field Notes,
November 2001. No reliable data exists on total CPN(M) funding, but the annual
intake would appear to be but several millions.
36. Only in Phase 3―when mobile warfare gives way to the so-called “war of
position”―do the insurgents endeavor to hold ground.
37. Field Notes, May 2002.
38. This was not only an administrative blow but a key step in establishing
Maoist political dominance, for VDC candidates were affiliated with the major
political parties. The result was that the legal left bore the brunt of the Maoist
assault, since some 2,600 VDC Chairmen of the 3,913 possible were UML members.
Ibid.
39. Field Notes, November 2002. The first year of the Maoist offensive
(November 2001-November 2002) saw 1,321 VDC buildings completely destroyed,
according to government figures, as per the following breakdown by regions: Far
West, 316 of 383, 82.5 percent; Mid-Western, 165 of 575, 28.7 percent; Western, 221
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of 865, 25.5 percent; Central, 334 of 1,199, 27.8 percent; and Eastern, 285 of 893, 31.9
percent. VDC continued to be destroyed at such a clip, though, that the statistics
were already surpassed at time of release.
40. Ibid.
41. It is significant that leaders steadfastly maintain no inspiration from (or
knowledge of) the Khmer Rouge case. It is ironic, then, as per Bhattarai to Tiwari,
op.cit., to read a claim such as: “There is no independent and authentic account
of events in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge available so far. Whatever is
emanating from the Western media appears to be highly exaggerated to us.” Such,
of course, is an untenable position which ranks with “Holocaust Denial” but is
representative of many ad hoc CPN(M) pronouncements. Essential reading on
the Khmer Rouge would include: Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power,
and Genocide in Cambodia Under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79, New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 1996; and How Pol Pot Came to Power: A History of Communism in
Kampuchea, 1930-1975, London: Verso, 1985; David P. Chandler, Brother Number
One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992; and
David P. Chandler, Voices From S-21: Terror and History in Pol Pot’s Secret Prison,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999; Kenneth Quinn, “Political Change
in Wartime: The Khmer Krahom Revolution Southern Cambodia, 1970-1974,”
Naval War College Review, Vol. 28, Spring, pp. 3-31; Kenneth Quinn, The Origins
and Development of Radical Cambodian Communism, Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Maryland, 1982; Karl D. Jackson, ed., Cambodia 1975-1978: Rendezvous With Death,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; Michael Vickery, Cambodia 19751982, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 1999; and Elizabeth Becker, When the War Was
Over: Cambodia and the Khmer Rouge Revolution, New York: Public Affairs, 1986.
42. By the declaration of the recent ceasefire in late January 2003, an apparent
21 assassinations had been carried out in the Kathmandu Valley, to include two
Nepalese security personnel employed by the U.S. Embassy. The goal of united
front activity, as per Bhatarrai to Tiwari (op.cit.), is transparent:
In the current triangular balance of forces―namely (among)
the monarchists, parliamentary democrats and revolutionary
democrats―if the latter two democratic forces are able to mount
a joint struggle against the feudal aristocratic forces, there are
strong chances that democracy will be consummated in the
country in the near future.
43. In a move that increased the vacuum of authority in rural areas, the
authorities systematically confiscated weapons―most for hunting―from the
populace. Examination of security force statistics citing “weapons captured”
reveals a predominance of “musket guns.” Best evidence indicates these are
weapons confiscated from civilians and not pieces actually captured from
guerrillas.
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44. Field Notes, November 2002. The force was rapidly expanding and likely
has already reached its anticipated strength of 25,000.
45. In contrast, a total of 850 civilians are listed as having been killed since the
declaration of people’s war on February 13, 1996.
46. Data which follow are from my Field Notes, April-May 2003.
47. Ibid. Local records could not provide total police strength in the years
under discussion, but it clearly was but in the hundreds. Even today, there are but
300 police personnel assigned to the district.
48. Though such detailed figures are not available for the country as a
whole, my data indicates that of 1,682 stations total, 895 (or 53.2 percent) have
been “consolidated” with other stations, i.e., abandoned, leaving just 787 stations
remaining. Field Notes, August 2003.
49. In Rolpa, the VDC heads numbered 51, affiliated with the major parties as
follows: UML, 23; NC, 18; RPP (the successors to the conservative backers of the
old panchayet regime, 8; and Independent, 2. Ibid.
50. In one village studied, there were but three cadres, well-known to villagers.
They were normally referred to as the Opportunist, the Criminal, and the Young
Lenin. The first was a former Nepali Congress (NC) member who, following his
own kidnap and ransom, had become a Maoist, apparently to safeguard the family
property. Other members of his family, having moved to the tarai, remained
prominent NC politicians. The second had spent 10 months in jail for his previous
Maoist activities and had been released under the terms of the ceasefire. He was
the most dangerous of the lot and was eager for “payback.” The third was a high
school student who effected Leninist dress and seemed a true believer. Yet he
attended classes faithfully and, according to his instructors, caused no difficulties.
Field Notes, April-May 2003.
51. The Opportunist discussed above, for instance, had 7 months prior to my
arrival accused the village postman of being a spy and had summoned a section
(i.e. squad) of guerrillas who had taken the man away, bound. He has disappeared,
despite the efforts of his family (a wife and four children) to locate him. Likewise,
the Criminal worked closely with guerrillas in the area and regularly threatened
villagers, at one point telling a teacher that but for the ceasefire, he was dead.
Finally, the Young Lenin, despite all his admirable characteristics―and probably
precisely because of his clean-cut, wholesome appearance―had apparently been
tapped to make regular trips to Kathmandu to work with surveillance teams
preparing targets for the urban terror campaign. Ibid.
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52. RNA captain, Field Notes, April-May 2003.
53. Census figures (projections) put the 2001 population of Dolakha at 204,229,
of whom a plurality were Chhetri (58,183), or 28.5 percent. Another 18,791 (9.2
percent) were Hill Brahmins; 27,619 (13.5 percent) were Tamang; and just 3,392
(1.7 percent) were Magars. Yet guerrilla units in the area were visibly dominated
by the latter and drew support from Magar communities.
54. All communications observed, whether between cadres and guerrillas,
or within and between guerrilla units, were by hard copy message. There is
widespread presence in hill areas of transistor radios, indicating lack of familiarity
with technology is not an issue. Field Notes, April-May 2003.
55. Field Notes, April-May 2003. It is noteworthy that efforts to draw guerrillas
into discussions concerning their relationship to terror actions invariably led to
responses such as: “Lower level party cadres are involved in such actions, not
the battalions. We just fight.” This could well have been true, since it was neither
possible to establish affiliation of guerrillas observed engaging in enforcement
activities (during field work in Rolpa) nor to determine the extent of independent
guerrilla formations outside the battalion structure. It was noted that half-sections
and sections from battalions were constantly moving through the hills, and this
accords with villager descriptions of such-sized units carrying out terror actions.
56. Captured weapons predominate, with the most common high-powered
firearm being the .303 Lee Enfield taken from the police. SLRs taken from the
RNA are uncommon enough to be relegated to leadership figures, such as
Section Leaders. Efforts to tap the extensive arms black market in South Asia
have apparently met with minimal success. There is evidence of attempts to look
further afield, though. One intercepted shipment of high-powered firearms was
coming from Burma. There have been reports of corrupt Chinese officials also
providing surplus weapons for a price. Ibid.
57. The dimensions of this phenomenon are difficult to assess. INSEC’s
Human Rights Yearbook 2003 (p. vii) lists 17,564 displaced persons for 2002, a
modest figure which would seem too low. As CDO (Chief District Officer) Rolpa,
Tejprasad Paudel, noted, when commenting on the high number of passports his
office had been issuing daily: “And you do not even need a passport to go to India.
Lots of people have been leaving.” My own observation in western Rolpa counted
roughly 20 percent of the houses abandoned in villages. Field Notes, April-May
2003.
58. Field Notes, November 2002. Precise figure at the time was given as 54,245.
This has apparently increased.
59. Taking the figures detailed so far, the Maoists have killed at least 2,187
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individuals; 50 percent (1,093) have been police, another 11.1 percent (244) RNA,
and the remaining 38.9 percent (850) civilians. Figures (dead) for the “people’s
war” phase of the Peruvian case, 1980-92 (the latter date marked the capture of
Sendero Luminoso leader Guzman and other top cadre), are: police, 1,369; armed
forces, 909; civilians, 10,640. See Palmer in Crenshaw, p. 271.
60. This figure, the present highest estimate, must be used with a great deal of
caution. Perhaps 3,000 of the deaths are attributed to the Maoists, INSEC counts
only 2,021 in its 2002 report, the remainder to the security forces. Ironically, the
5,000+ does tally reasonably with the government’s own released figures for
enemy killed-in-action, but efforts to validate these have run up against a serious
level of misstatement and exaggeration. In one case, a report of 21 dead Maoists
was found, upon investigation by Western observers, to involve but two actual
bodies. The justification for the higher count was that the guerrillas were seen to
have been hit. Field Notes, February 2002. The irony is that cause-oriented groups
appear to take the 5,000+ figure at face value and then use limited, impressionistic
evidence to put an actual figure to the number of those killed in error―and thus
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democrat would shy away from this.
74. Particularly useful, amid the myriad works devoted to the Ulster conflict
and the IRA/PIRA, is Richard English, Armed Struggle: A History of the IRA,
London: Macmillan, 2003. His discussion focuses upon insurgent intentions and
calculations in the struggle.
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